analysis. The importance of this question is measured by the person who asked it publicly for the first time: former Niger President Mahamadou Issoufou.
L’The problem has come without attention. The response of the former head of state is enough to make us think about the multiple consequences of the agreement for peace and reconciliation in Mali. For Mahamadou Issoufou, there is no doubt that the implementation of the agreement has undermined the stability of the region: “Kidal poses a threat to Niger’s internal security. He added: “There are movements in the Algiers peace agreement that are related to terrorists. Colluded. We cannot admit this,” he said publicly in September 2019.
The fact is that despite the ceasefire between the signatory’s armed groups and the Malian army (but not properly observed between the armed groups), although the security situation in the Sahel region continued to deteriorate from the year the agreement was signed to 2015. The French military forces stationed in Barhane fought against the jihadists. Since 2015, two phenomena have emerged: violent fighting between rival signatories in the north and the expansion of the conflict from 2016 to central Mali, then Burkina Faso and Niger.
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The agreement triggered economic, political, and military competition among local communities that polluted the area.
The first is the question of being able to benefit from the benefits provided by the agreement: the daily allowance of the agreement management committee and subcommittee, public work at all levels, the work of ministers (the current four ministers are from armed groups) and consultants to the Bamako authorities, To abandon the abandonment and restoration of officers or other work in the public affairs of the 75,000 “ex-combatants” in the northern region. These armed groups are sponsored by the armed groups that provided the list, and finally replaced the local elected officials in the north by the interim authorities, three of them The second is appointed by armed groups. It is obvious that the ethnic minorities: armed groups mainly from Tuaregs Ifugas and Idnanes, Arabs, occupying the largest share, harming Songhais, Piur, Belas and Several Tuareg tribes (Daoussaks, Chaman Amas, Kel Ansar, Oulliminden), although native in most areas.
In addition, on the political level, these two later communities were neither Ifoghas (aristocratic tribes in Kidal region) nor Imghad (a tributary of Ifoghas, trying to free themselves from the rule of Ifoghas masters) attracted Ifoghas-Imghads to fight for Kidal Rule. Therefore, they established their own armed movement to defend their communities.
This led to the “ethnic cleansing” of the main signatories of the CMA (Coordination Association of the Azawad Movement, former separatist insurgents) and the platform (pro-Bamako armed group). MNLA has become more apparent that Idnane (the Tuareg tribe allied with Ifoghas) and HCUA are purely Ifoghas and Islamists, which brings it closer to Ansar led by Iyad Ag Ghali, the leader of Ifoghas in the 1990-1992 rebellion. Ding jihadists. Tuaregs Daoussaks and Chaman Amas (two different tribes) split and formed their own militias, namely MSA-D (against Daoussaks) and MSA-C (against Chaman Amas). Then it’s the turn of Tuaregs Kel Ansar in the Tumbuktu area.
Third consequence: According to the authorization of the agreement, the number of these armed groups has increased in order to retain their weapons before the implementation of the peace process and to circulate in the refuge areas of other semi-nomadic communities when kidnapping and violence are unavoidable (Peuls ) Or sedentary (Songhaïs) caused the self-defense and weaponry needs of all those threatened by armed Tuareg. This is a return to the situation of the past few centuries. In an area where balance is finally achieved, the area allows people to coexist peacefully with mankind through alliances and traditions. This armed division between tribes has led to a series of violent conflicts. The spread has spread to the middle of the country, and the attacks by jihadist groups trying to use these divisions have also exacerbated the spread.
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These connections either come from politics and tribal relations, or from the need to defend oneself in an environment polluted by armed tribalization.
HCUA, the High Commission for the Unification of Azawad, the main armed group of the UAE Armed Forces, the coordination of the Azawad movement (former separatists) has a clear ideological and tribal connection with the jihadist group Ansar Dean. HCUA was founded in 2013 and comes from the Islamic Movement of Asawad (MIA), which itself is derived from Ansar Dine. Its secretary-general, Alghabass Ag Intallah, was the son of Ifoghas, and then the brother of Amenokal (traditional chieftain) of MNLA at the time. He first founded MIA and then joined the chief representative of Isar Ag Ag Ghali, Ansar Dingen. The two leaders belonged to the same aristocratic tribe of Ifoghas, and both had an Islamic agenda. This is today’s means to achieve the Islamic agenda against them. HCUA is becoming more and more dominant among armed groups.
Many people accuse HCUA of never actually establishing contact with Iyad Ag Ghali. In any case, it is clear that HCUA opposes any anti-terrorist fight against Aiyad. HCUA’s method of arming is sometimes the same as that of jihadists: A UN expert report in August 2019 stated: “The HCUA and the Intallah family established their control over the entire Kidal region in the context of the assassination. In broad daylight. Kidal City under”.
As for the MAA, a member of the CMA (former separatist coordinator), the Azawad Arab movement, “some of the famous figures are suspected of being drug dealers, while others are accused of cooperating with jihadists” (Moctar Ag Mohamedoun). The report of the UN Panel of Experts also accused loyal MAA members of involvement in terrorist organizations and drug trafficking.