analysis. The Mali Peace and Reconciliation Agreement signed in Algiers in 2015 was paralyzed, and its signatories seem to be increasingly deviating from its spirit.
askUyd who respects territorial unity? What is the way in which the armed movement is transformed into a political party to promote its plan in a peaceful way? What reform? These are all questions that justify whether we can still preserve the Algiers agreement. One issue of particular concern is that disarmament has been deadlocked for six years. The militia is keen to keep weapons, even buying new weapons and proudly displaying them. They said that this will only be the case after the government implements the institutional reforms stipulated in the agreement. However, Bamako cannot guarantee that if a deep regional division is carried out as planned, the groups that signed the agreement will be disarmed. Will ethnic minority militias like the so-called self-defense groups in the middle of the country have no other excuses to maintain their armed forces, such as insecurity between communities or fighting with jihadists? Can we get out of this dilemma? Let’s place the frame to get some answers.
Mali: Algiers agreement, chimera or reality?
Bamako has some fears that must be overcome. They prevented him from moving forward. Here they are:
-The very extensive regionalization stipulated in the agreement, as well as the practice of direct universal suffrage and very broad powers to elect regional presidents are worrying.What are the consequences?
As long as armed groups dominate all areas of northern Mali and show separatist tendencies, there is still a sense of mistrust: the removal of the Malian flag, the celebration of the anniversary of the separatist rebellion, the military marches of the signing groups in Kidal, the armed control of these groups Territory expansion, quasi-sovereign statutes promulgated by the CMA (coordination of the Azawad movement, former separatists).
It should be remembered that the planned regionalization (federalism without its own name) transfers the capacity of almost all states to the local level. The districts where the president and the chief executive are led by direct universal suffrage will adopt the official name of their choice. They will have autonomy in finance, budget, economy and basic social services, such as education and vocational training, health care, infrastructure and equipment.
In terms of justice, the sovereignty of the country is still recognized. However, the agreement still provides for “deep judicial reforms” aimed at integrating “traditional and customary systems” and “strengthening the role of Kadiz (Islamic judges) in justice.”
On security issues, the agreement calls for the establishment of regional police, without even mentioning the existence or role of the national police. Article 28 of the agreement also stipulates that the “local security advisory committee” composed of local representatives and other local officials shall be the responsibility of the local administrative head.
Except for representatives who only have control over subsequent legitimacy, the Malian government has almost no territory that can guarantee that armed groups will not manipulate planned local elections for their benefit? Similar to the former Soviet Union, after the president of the Federal Republic is elected through direct universal suffrage, is there no danger of splitting the country? This problem arises because Mali is a fragile, fragile, and dysfunctional country whose representatives and symbols are condemned by the majority of the population.
-The impossible and necessary formulation of the “National Charter” for peace, unification and national reconciliation
The agreement requires that in order to “find a lasting solution to the conflict” and “true national reconciliation,” the drafting of this charter, among other things, must take into account the famous “Azawad problem.” Unfortunately, the government’s text proposal was rejected by the former rebels. The failure to reach consensus on this important text at this stage indicates that there are still ambiguities and political differences, even if the implementation of the agreement is constrained by a shared vision.
-Agreement is not welcome
The agreement has only the genuine support of armed groups and the international community of guarantors. In Mali, people first thought it was imposed from abroad, and after the military defeat in May 2014, after the conclusion of the Kidal battle between the army and the separatists, it was signed with a knife under the cunning throat. A basic text has not yet been approved or discussed by Parliament, nor has it become the subject of a propaganda campaign. Even though the agreement provides a basis for combating impunity for war crimes in principle, it also provides many personal rewards for former insurgents to avoid their brutal acts. However, Malian law established an amnesty. The agreement also provides for a series of economic development projects reserved for the “Northern Development Zone” under “catch-up”, while other areas in the central and southern parts of the country are equally poor.